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ABSTRACT
Since 2012, there has been an increase of media attention on the Kurds, particularly
women who are active in the YPJ and Peshmerga. Various publications have equated women’s
militarization with women’s liberation. In an effort to more accurately measure this, the
following question must be asked; what is the effect of women’s military involvement on
women’s rights? Women that are active in both nationalist movements and traditional state
armies are presented with changing gender roles. Post conflict, there is a struggle for women to
transfer their newfound autonomy into political activism. The theory outlines a chain in which
women participate in the armed forces, feel empowered, are able to obtain positions of influence,
and create policy and social change. A break in any point of this chain will block female excombatants from influencing women’s rights. The theory is tested on Kurdish women active in
the Iraqi Peshmerga and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) in Syria. Data on women’s
military participation and their impact on women’s rights was gathered from NGO reports, news
articles, scholarly journals, and laws that were passed in Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Syria. The
evidence gathered indicates that women’s military participation is not the only mechanism for
improving women’s rights. While the development of gender equality in Northern Syria can be
linked to women’s militarization, gender equality efforts in Iraqi Kurdistan do not have a direct
link to women’s involvement in the Peshmerga. This work adds to the ongoing discussion on
Kurdish political rights, particularly women's autonomy.
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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 2013, Western media outlets like BBC and Reuters started to cover stories
of Kurdish women soldiers in the Peshmerga and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ).
Similarly, Vogue Italia featured a photo series of female Kurdish fighters in January of 2018,
titled “Jin Jian Azadi”, which in Kurdish translates to “Women, Life, Freedom” (Hamad, 2018).
The women that were featured were commonly described as being “badass”, “beautiful”, and in
one case drew comparison to Angelina Jolie (Dehghanpishesh & Georgy 2016; Dirik, 2014; Gol,
2016). The women included in these narratives provided inflammatory rhetoric against ISIS,
threatening to “tear them apart” (Dehghanpishesh & Georgy, 2016).
These firsthand accounts provide information on how Kurdish women are rising up and
joining ranks, as well as offers insight into the motivations for women entering armed struggle.
Although the articles provide insight into women’s positions in the military, they do little to
describe the complete narrative on how Kurdish women are treated outside of battle. Therefore,
these accounts do not question broader societal gender roles, and seemingly equate women’s
military involvement with women’s liberation. This study poses the following questions: what
are the effects of female militarization on women’s rights? Outside of the military, what do the
rights of Kurdish women look like? If they are able to attain high-ranking military positions, can
these roles transfer to the political and civilian sectors? To understand how women’s rights
change through militarization, women’s roles must be studied beyond the battlefront. This
research aims to bridge the gaps between the media coverage of Kurdish women as liberators
and whether or not gender equality is being pursued in Iraqi Kurdistan and Rojava.
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Historically, war and conflict have been studied and understood through male
experiences of militarization (Henshaw, 2015; Thomas & Bond, 2015). In addition to this,
studies on the impact of war and conflict have traditionally excluded women (Blattman, 2009).
However, the number of studies on women and militarization has grown since the mid 20th
century (Di Leonardo, 1985; Segal, 1995). This research aims to reach beyond male excombatants, and rather focuses on the challenges, experiences and changes that are unique to
Kurdish women once they return from battle. Feminist scholars present two different approaches
to female militarization. Antimilitarist feminists argue that militarization is rooted in patriarchy
and therefore marginalizes women (Enloe 2000, Kirk 2018). Feminists that support women’s
military participation argue that including women promotes them to the same level of citizenship
as men and provides career opportunities (Feinman, 2000). Beyond this, there are theories that
believe that women’s military involvement can serve as an avenue for policy change, activism,
and eventually observable improvements in women’s rights.
The theory discussed in this study examines female militarization does not always
translate into an improvement in women’s rights. This approach outlines a mechanism in which
female ex-combatants pursue different initiatives to create change. By applying the theoretical
framework to women in the Peshmerga and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), pursuits of
gender equality among the Kurds are better understood. This research therefore attempts to
clearly analyze women’s political and societal efforts, and whether or not they are creating
choices and opportunities for women is actualized.
Studying Kurdish women in particular offers several distinct advantages. This is a
population that is not constricted by formal state structures, so there are less variables regarding
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the creation of women’s organizations and changing gender roles. The findings of the study
suggest that the process of women’s liberation is drastically different between the Kurds of Iraq
and the Kurds of Syria. The process of inclusion of women in the Peshmerga as well as in public
life in Iraqi Kurdistan has been far more gradual than the changing roles of women in northern
Syria; otherwise known as Rojava. There is greater support for the claim that there is a women’s
revolution in Rojava as compared to Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite the ongoing changes for women’s
rights in each of these regions, there is room for improvement for pursuits of gender equality.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The use of women in different militaries can be examined across cultures throughout
history. Despite female militarization being an ancient practice, scholarship on the societal effect
of women in combat roles is relatively new. The scholarship that currently exists and continues
to develop can be seen across studies in political science, sociology, anthropology and women’s
and gender studies. In both established militaries and rebel groups, women are useful in a
symbolic way. Even if women are used for symbolism in a military, they are still able to use new
skills and autonomy to influence change post conflict. Women that are active in rebel groups,
however, may not be able to as easily translate their new skills into post conflict society. In both
recognized and unrecognized states, the ability to influence policy and therefore make changes
are largely dependent on what policy and state-building frameworks are accessible to women.
The literature review will examine several different groups and sub-groups. First,
women’s military participation in established states will be discussed. This serves as a baseline
for comparing and understanding women in rebel movements. Literature on methods of policy
change, specifically among women and ex-combatants, are also part of this review. The actors in
this study are female ex-combatants, so these two categories serve to show how other women
and other ex-combatants work to influence policy.
The impact of women’s military participation on gender equality in established states
varies. The literature indicates that although some states may use women for their own
recruitment purposes, there are cases in which female ex-combatants can use their new skills to
their advantage. There is less variation, however, in non-state armies. Many of these movements
fail to include women in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process post
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conflict. Regarding women in policy activism, whether male legislators support women in
politics can impact women’s political mobility. In ex-combatant policy activism, the literature
implies that ex-combatants are an underutilized resource in the DDR process.

Women’s Military Participation in Established States
Established state militaries offer opportunities for women to enter conflict. The motives
for state militaries that use women are sometimes questioned, and are criticized for only using
women to garner “patriotic zeal”, yet will demobilize them once there is an actual outbreak of
conflict (Enloe, 1980). The white women that were used in the South African Defense were used
to symbolize white unity, and served in a subordinate nature that failed to destroy “patriarchal
authority relations” (Unterhalter, 1987; Cock, 1994). The United States Army in the 1970s
enlisted women to meet recruitment goals. Women were not a necessity ten years later, and so
the military closed off specialties for women that had been already completed training for
(Stiehm, 1989). In other cases, women that serve in the military are able to make a broader
societal influence afterward. Women that serve in the Israeli Defense Forces have voiced
criticism of the IDF and engaged in political protests. (Sasson-Levy et al., 2011). Women’s
protests as soldiers offers a new perspective to women’s antiwar movements that states cannot
ignore (Sasson-Levy et al. 2011). During conflict, women can begin to develop skills that are
then utilized following war. Women in the Chinese military have served in noncombatant roles
and have experienced personal benefits from exposure to education and training opportunities
(Li, 1993).
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Despite some of the advantages that women are able to gain, there are still roadblocks
that women face in state military integration. Women in armed forces still have limited
representation in higher-ranking posts as well as traditional combatant roles (Carreiras, 2006). In
Canada, the military and the use of women is not reflected in civilian life. The Canadian military
is still largely based off of a patriarchal frame, and is therefore resistant to women being treated
as equals within the military (Winslow and Dunn, 2002). Even in societies that provide the
structures and support necessary for women, particularly ex-combatants, these resources are not
always taken advantage of. It was found that within the United States, female ex-combatants
were less likely than men to take advantage of Veterans Affairs centers (Segal and Lane, 2002).
These established state militaries offer different opportunities, levels of involvement for
women and therefore different outcomes. Militaries are still largely based off of patriarchal
frames, yet women are still included and somewhat integrated. Women that are active in state
militaries are overall able to develop new skillsets, regardless of the intentions of state militaries
including them. Although women are able to be active in state militaries, they do not always
have broader impact on the rest of society. Further examining why women’s military
participation does not always translate to broader participation is important to study because it
answers several questions. Research on women’s military participation illustrates both how war
impacts women and how women impact war. By understanding this, researchers and
policymakers can implement policies and initiatives that secure women’s rights post conflict.
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Women in Rebel Movements
The examples previously mentioned discuss established state militaries, and therefore
greatly differ from non-state militant groups. Non-state militant groups, especially nationalist
movements, have used women in their operations. Out of seventy different rebel movements that
have been active since 1990, women were active in 60 percent of them (Henshaw, 2015). They
are therefore worth studying separately from established state actors. National liberation
movements like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Irish Republican Army offered
more opportunities for women’s military involvement than the nation states that these groups
fought in. Despite these movements providing positions for women, individual men within these
groups are less likely to want women to gain equal status (Alison, 2004). Women have also been
used in Bolshevik Combat units, the Chinese Revolution, Vietnamese Revolutions, and the
Lebanese Civil War (Enloe, 1980). Aside from nationalist movements, women have been
involved in non-nationalist rebel groups. During the Nepalese Civil War, about 40 percent of the
Maoist cadres were women (Fontanella-Khan, 2009). The Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) also used female combatants. The FARC was attractive to female recruits
because it presented not only an escape from discrimination, but also a way of securing equality
(Stanski, 2006). Post conflict Namibia had weak policies for reintegrating ex-combatants,
particularly those that were either disabled or female (Dzinesa, 2007).
It can be argued that women were seen as an invaluable resource for a strive toward
independence, yet broader women’s issues were not a true concern of these movements. Instead,
nationalist groups have used women’s support during times of struggle, yet have faced criticism
for failing to meet women’s demands (Scarnecchia, 1996). Enloe (1989, 44) asserts that
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nationalism has “sprung up from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and
masculinized hope.” This means that when a conflict reaches its end, the image and rhetoric that
were once used to recruit women return to fit a “patriarchal, heterosexual familial model”
(Sunindyo, 1998 p. 3). After demobilization in Sierra Leone, male rebels were encouraged to
enlist in the Sierra Leone Army, but female ex combatants did not receive this form of
legitimacy (Coulter, 2009). Women that were active soldiers in Sierra Leone were largely left out
of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process post conflict because their roles as
soldiers were largely ignored (MacKenzie, 2009).
In other cases, women are able to make an impact in liberation movements, yet their

social status post conflict regresses to the way it was before the conflict began. After the civil
war in El Salvador, some FMLN female ex-combatants became activists within the FMLN
political party, or as elected officials in town councils (Viterna, 2013). Female ex-combatants
who did not take these roles either returned to their traditional pre-conflict wars or lacked
opportunities despite feeling empowered (Viterna, 2013). Women who attempted to challenge
gender roles during and post conflict were met with public backlash, serving as an incentive to
avoid the public eye and not to pursue political activity (Pankhurst, 2012). Similarly, women that
were in the EPLF in Eritrea experienced a never before seen level of equality, yet were faced
with challenges when they returned from conflict (Rolston, 2010). Girls as young as age twelve
that have been recruited as soldiers will return to their families “newly assertive and
independent”, yet will have little economic opportunities (McKay, 1998). Female ex combatants
in Eritrea were not able to wed after combat, as they were criticized for being “too emancipated”
(Rolston, 2007).
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When legal processes do allow for the inclusion of women, the desired effects are not
always carried out into practice. Despite women parliamentary candidates making electoral gains
in post conflict Rwanda and Uganda, ordinary women were still subject to rape and violence
(Moran, 2010). Female ex-combatants are typically overlooked in disarmament, demobilization,
reintegration and transitional justice processes. These programs limit women to traditional
gender roles and deter female ex combatants from participating in them (Ortega, 2010). Ortega
(2010) argues that further research on female ex combatants and a stronger government focus on
reintegrating women in post conflict is needed in these cases. However, there are cases within
Africa in which post conflict, quota systems were established for women’s involvement. Tripp
(2015) found that 76 percent of post conflict countries implemented a quota system for women,
in comparison of 58 percent of non-conflict countries doing the same. This serves as another
example of conflict impacting and restructuring gender roles.
The Zapatista movement during 1990’s Mexico did provide outlets and resources for
women (Castillo, 2002). Women’s involvement in the Chiapas Rebellion changed the face of
Mexican feminism that was emerging at the time to include indigenous women (La Botz, 1999).
The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) was able to gain political influence and use
it to the advantage of women. The EZLN promulgated the Women’s Revolutionary Law, which
granted women the right to choose their husbands and how many children they wanted to have.
The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was a rebel movement that used female soldiers
who later were able to build businesses and gain influence within civil society (Utas, 2005).
Women take on untraditional roles by fighting in conflict, but even civilian women are impacted
by ongoing war. Wood (2008, p. 539) outlines “political mobilization, military socialization,
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polarization of social identities, militarization of local authority, transformation of gender roles
and fragmentation of the local political economy” as social processes occurring during war.
As earlier stated in the literature reviewed, women in armed non-state militaries have
different experiences than women who are involved in established state militaries. This research
contributes the assessment that the lack of political structure facing nationalist rebel movements
creates a unique space for women. When conflict rises, rhetoric is used to recruit them, yet post
conflict female ex combatants are not likely to be able to make societal gains. One of the ways in
which female ex-combatants will try to create societal gains is through pursuing policy change.
Studying policy change strategies used by female ex-combatants bridges the gap between women
participating in conflict, gaining skills, and then applying them to the political sphere.

Methods of Policy Change
After military service, women who feel empowered and able will likely try to pursue

social change. One of the mechanisms that can make this possible is engaging in policy
change. It is therefore crucial to understand how methods of policy change compare
between different groups. For the purpose of this study, female ex-combatants are

examined. Thus, the following sections will discuss a broad overview of policy change

followed by discussions on women in policy change and ex-combatants in policy change.
According to Hugh Heclo, policy change results from not only large scale social and

economic change, but from interactions between people within a policy community (Sabatier,
1988). Therefore, it is crucial to study the actions of individuals in these groups. By examining
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the methods in which actors influence these changes, women’s activism and pursuits for social
change during peacetime can be understood. This serves as a frame of reference for how war and
women’s military participation can influence these mechanisms.
The methods of policy change that are pursued by activists vary between governments.
Several examples of policy change include street level bureaucrats, policy entrepreneurs, and
policy brokers. Street level bureaucrats are defined as individuals who represent the government
in their interactions with people (Lipsky, 1969). Policy entrepreneurs are individuals who are
within the policy process, and who use their own resources in hopes of influencing a specific
policy proposal (Shearer, 2015). Christopoulos (2006) emphasizes that policy entrepreneurs are
limited by policy networks. He also asserts that actors with low political capital will engage in
high risk actions, yet actors with high political capital can pursue long term, low risk policies.
Policy brokers are members of coalitions that attempt to find mediation between two groups
pursuing different policies (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994). Sørensen (2002) introduces the
concept that the relationship between politics and administration is dynamic and subject to
continuous renegotiation. These theories of policy change can be broadly applied to different
states and different actors. The following sections will narrow this focus onto women and excombatants.

Women in Policy Change
Studying how women in general may influence policy change serves as a baseline to
compare how female ex-combatants policy change pursuits compare. Additionally, examining
11

women’s efforts toward policy change offers general insights into women’s successes and

failures in this area. Goetz (2005) discusses five different forms that women’s policy agencies
adopt. These agencies may be advocacy or advisory units, policy monitoring units, units with

implementation responsibilities, or commissions with investigation powers. Important to note is
that the inclusion of women in government is not the only determining factor in an increase in
pro-women legislation. Other important factors include the support of male legislators and the
relationship between female legislators that actors in civil society and aid efforts (Wang, 2013).
International norms, pressure from civic movements, and actions taken by individuals all have
the potential to influence policy (Htun, 2016). Despite the impact of these factors, international
organizations have used inclusion of women in parliament as a measure for a country’s progress
toward gender equality. What results, argues Htun (2016) is the inclusion of women without true
representation.
The methods of influencing policy previously outlined imply a socially structured
relationship between individuals and their government. The creation of post-conflict policy,
however, presents new challenges. Policy makers must decide whether or not ex-combatants
should be treated as a separate interest group (Kingma, 1997). Beyond this, reintegration of
women, and therefore including them in these policies, can lead to tensions within communities
(Kingma, 1997). The scope of these assertions is limited, as socially structured relationships can
only be applicable to established, internationally recognized states. Therefore, there are
important questions to be asked regarding the relationship between individuals and states that are
not internationally recognized. Literature on rebel groups and non-state armies offer insights into
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some of these questions. One group worthy of studying in this framework are ex-combatants and
their efforts for policy change.

Ex-Combatants in Policy Change
There is recent literature that suggests that ex-combatants are a resource for policy
building and social change (Friðriksdóttir, 2018). Sonpar (2008) discusses an “activist
orientation” exhibited by ex-militants in Jammu and Kashmir. She argues that the subjects in her
study show the potential that ex-militants have for activism and peace building. The United
Nations is known for its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives, commonly
referred to as DDR (United Nations Peacekeeping). Ex-combatants influencing policy change
falls under reintegration. According to Özerdem (2002, p. 962), “reintegration is the process
whereby former combatants and their families and other displaced persons are assimilated into
the social and economic life of (civilian) communities.” Reintegrating ex-combatants into
politics is an important part of the DDR process to ensure that they do not feel a need to return to
arms (Bowd & Özerdem, 2013).
The DDR process has resulted in various successes and failures. A study in Uganda
found that forced recruitments into the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) were more likely to vote
and be community leaders (Blattman, 2009). The abductees interviewed “described, after return,
a sense of power over their lives and events” (Blattman, 2009, p. 243). This implies that excombatants experience life altering events that make them more politically active. With this
being said, female ex-combatants do not always experience the same agency. Ortega and Maria
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(2010) question the inclusion of female ex-combatants in the DDR process. They state that DDR
programs often encourage the “return of women to the domestic and private sphere” (Ortega &
Maria, 2010, p. 2).
Examining theories of policy change offers insights into how individual actors pursue
policy change within formal recognized states. Unrecognized states and national liberation
movements are subject to rapidly changing social structures. The motives of the different armed
forces as well as the political avenues and structures that are present for women greatly impact
what roles women will serve in larger society once they return from combat. The goal of this
study is to establish linkages between women’s military service and changes in women’s rights
and roles. Therefore, the following section outlines a theoretical framework explaining why
women’s militarization does not always lead to an increase in women’s rights.

14

THEORY
As previously discussed, there are both rebel movements and state militaries that employ
women as soldiers. However, using women in militaries is not enough in itself to lead to
improvements in women’s rights. Instead, there are a series of steps that must be taken for policy
change regarding women to take place. The theory tests the assertions made by scholars that
Feinman (2000, p. 12) refers to as “feminist egalitarian militarists”. These scholars treat
participation as a mechanism for an increase in women’s rights within that society. This can be
observed in a few recognized states, but there are fewer examples in unrecognized states. This
research aims to establish that women’s military participation does not always lead to increased
rights within unrecognized states. Unrecognized states are subject to new and developing
systems of government, and are not limited by a political class system like established states.
In order to appreciate the different roles that women have in these two structures, it is
important to note the differences between recognized and unrecognized states. Unrecognized
states are defined as lacking international recognition, having an aspiration for independent
status as a state, and have control of some territory (Caspersen and Stansfield, 2011). Because of
this, unrecognized states have different motives and norms within the international system. They
are subject to new and developing systems of government, and are not limited by a formalized
political system like established states. These differences between recognized and unrecognized
states apply to the use of women in their militaries as well. Unrecognized states are not bound
by pre-existing state structures. Therefore, they provide an environment in which there are
seemingly less formal restraints on women than in recognized states. One would then expect a
greater impact of women’s military participation in this environment. Women have been active
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in armed forces of unrecognized states. Specifically examining states that are not internationally
recognized offers a framework in which the impact of female military participation can be
observed.
As discussed by King (2001), unrecognized states in Eurasia have been able to defeat
recognized powers and create their own state structures. These structures that are created differ
greatly from established states. In Somaliland, the clan-based system of government ensures
survival and stability. This comes at the expense of the women of Somaliland, who would
benefit more from a liberal democracy rather than a clan based government. In the Puntland
region of Somalia, clan leaders indirectly elect government officials, leading to women being
disenfranchised (Johnson and Smaker 2014). Looking at these examples, it can be seen that
whether women make societal gains after conflict varies between recognized and unrecognized
states.
To understand why women’s military participation in unrecognized states usually does

not lead to increased rights in unrecognized sets, the path from participation in the armed forces
to changes in policy must be examined. Participation in the armed forces will enact political
change through the following series of steps. First, women participate in the armed forces. Then,
upon surviving war, ex combatants must feel empowered. Following this, there should be
societal opportunities for civic engagement. Women then use these positions to affect change or
influence policy. Finally, these societal outcomes that have been promoted by female leaders
should actually occur. There are cases in which the steps outlined below were followed, and
therefore policy change took place. This chain captures the efforts that women make in order to
be politically and socially represented within their society. Although there might be latent ways
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in which women enact change, this framework accounts for intentional actions in which women
seek to enact change. Therefore, a break in any of these links will prevent female ex-combatants
from enacting intentional societal or political change.

Participation
in the armed
forces

Ex
combatants
feel
empowered

Societal
opportunities
for
engagement

Tangibly
attaining
positions of
influence

Using
positions to
affect change
or influence
policy

Policy and
social change

Figure 1: Linkages for female ex-combatants creating social change

As demonstrated by the flowchart, the first step in the relationship is women’s
participation in the armed forces. For the purpose of this paper, participation in the armed forces
refers to women in combat roles. Although women have been used historically in auxiliary and
supporting roles, it is important to separately study the impact of women as soldiers (Gjelsvik,
2010). The integration of women into the military has disrupted the structure of the organization
that they are fighting for, so their ultimate return to their communities will also result in change.
The next step in the pathway to enacting policy change is that ex combatants feel
empowered. It is assumed that after surviving conflict, women return to either their previous
societies or are transplanted into a new one. After serving in conflict, the military roles that they
were in have led them to feel capable and motivated to be a part of societal change. A feeling of
empowerment may be difficult to measure, but it can be examined by the attitudes and actions of
female ex combatants. It can be assumed that women who return from conflict as recluses are not
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empowered. Returning combatants who are able to readjust to their new lives and take an active
interest in their surroundings and political processes are empowered.
After women survive conflict and feel empowered, there should be societal opportunities
for civic engagement. These opportunities for civic engagement act as a mechanism for newly
empowered women to feel comfortable with using their new identity to pursue a greater cause.
These opportunities can be in the civil sector, activist focused, or in government. Opportunities
for women’s civic engagement may have existed before conflict, but militarization of women
should lead to an increase in awareness of women’s issues, and therefore an increase in positions
for women. This includes the government having quotas to include women.
Once opportunities for civic engagement are determined to be present, women must act
on these opportunities and attain a position of influence. Even if opportunities are present within
a government, women may face obstacles in attaining positions. For positions of political
influence, like parliament or public office, candidates must be elected. Women may not be
elected for a number of reasons, given that a majority of the electorate may not agree with their
platform. Another underlying possibility for women not being able to enter public office are
sexist attitudes of the general population. Outside of government, opportunities for civic
engagement will exist in civil movements and non-governmental organizations. Women hoping
to join these movements must either be hired, appointed, or be recruited as a volunteer. The
ability and frequency of women to be chosen for civilian based movements indicate civilian
attitudes toward female ex combatants.
In the event that women are able to attain a position of influence, they must use their
positions to affect change or influence policy. Whether they are active in a nongovernmental
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organization or in public office, female ex combatants have the potential to use their role to
affect change. Women who hold public office may not fully utilize their influence to enact
change in an effort to appease their voter base. Similarly, women who are activists may feel
either pessimistic or that their society is not yet ready to embrace changes in gender relations.
The final result of the flow of women’s military participation is political and social
change. Once women return from war, feel empowered and are able to take advantage of the
opportunities presented, new legislation must be passed. It is assumed that female ex combatants
that are integrated into civil and political processes will vote in favor of policies that will benefit
women. For this outcome, it is not enough for laws to merely be passed. Regarding political
change specifically, the laws that are passed must be applied to the population. Although legal
frameworks may serve as a basis for increased rights for women, they must be enforced for
observable societal change to occur.
These linkages are required for policy change. If there is a break at any point in the
flowchart, policy change will be less likely to occur. The second linkage, “feeling empowered” is
a precondition for the study. This can be applied to women who leave combat positions, or
women who are ushered in to new leadership roles. This link can be easily broken as it is applied
individually to women. Therefore, individual factors such as personality and marital status may
impact whether or not a women feels empowered. Women not feeling empowered would be
observable in women voluntarily returning to the positions and status that they held before they
entered conflict. Female ex-combatants who are not empowered will not join communities or
participate in activist efforts. Alternatively, women who are placed in new leadership roles may
feel disillusioned with the cause that they initially aligned themselves with.
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The previously established precondition, feelings of empowerment, alone is not enough for
female ex-combatants to be able to influence or change policy. Rather, for engagement should be
available for these feelings to be translated into efforts for change. If women cannot hold
political office or hold jobs, then they are ultimately left without a medium to pursue social
change.
H1: If female ex-combatants do not attain positions of influence, then they are less likely
to influence or change policy
Gaining a position of influence is also a step that may not be actualized. These positions can be
in the government sector, private sector, politics, or non-profit work. These roles all serve as
mechanisms for women to be in leadership roles. Conservative attitudes about gender roles may
block women from filling these roles. Another reason for a lack of women in these positions is
that in many nationalist movements, the building of the state is seen as a main priority, leaving
women’s issues to be ignored (Mojab and Gorman, 2007). Even if women are able to make gains
during revolution, these new roles and positions may fade once conflict is resolved (Tank, 2017).
This allows for the public to ignore or overlook women as prospective job candidates or political
candidates.
H2: If female ex-combatants in positions of influence lack societal opportunities for
engagement or are not included in policy change discussions, then they are less likely to
influence or change policy
Even in the instance that women are able to gain influential positions, they may hesitate to
translate their power into policy change. Elected officials may not favor radical changes in hopes
of being reelected or in fear of receiving backlash. Similarly, it is possible that women who are
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newly employed may be excluded from important decisions. This hypothesis aims to measure
not the number of women in the job sector and in political office, but rather the women who are
able to translate their positions into change. Whether or not women are included in political
discussions and processes reflects the attitudes of the male politicians that they work with.
Women who serve in noncombat support roles in militaries will have different
experiences within the military. These support roles offer a more traditional route for women to
be involved militarily. Women were typically limited to nursing or secretarial positions, which
reflect gender stereotypes from the civilian sector (Quester, 1977). While the roles of combatants
and non-combatants may differ, societal attitudes toward these women post conflict are
sometimes very similar. In the case of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri
Lanka, women that served in either of these roles were not seen as suitable wives post-conflict
(Alison, 2004). Despite these similar societal expectations, this research questions whether
female combatants and non-combatants actually have different experiences post conflict. Excombatants obtain untraditional roles in a military, so it is worth questioning whether their
training and military service sets them apart from noncombatant women. What this study aims to
look at is the impact of women adopting new, untraditional combat roles and how this impacts
women’s rights.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
In testing the theory, two cases will be discussed. These cases will examine the use of
women in two different militaries; the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan and the Women’s Protection
Units (YPJ) in Northern Syria. The formation of the Peshmerga dates back to 1943, but they did
not receive international attention until they helped overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003 (Lortz
2012). Although the PKK has been active in Syria, The YPJ as well as the People’s Protection
Units (YPG) in Syria were not formed until 2012. The creation of these units was brought on by
the Rojava revolution. Figures vary across reports, but there are estimates that out of the 150,000
Peshmerga fighters, about 1,700 of them are women (Rudaw, 2017; Szoldra, 2017). Between the
YPG and the YPJ however, these numbers are more even, as women are estimated to make up
24,000 of the total combined 60,000 fighters (Perry, 2017)
Studying the use of women in Kurdish militaries and the effect of women’s rights in Iraqi
Kurdistan and Northern Syria are worth looking into for multiple reasons. More broadly, these
two cases offer insights into the roles of women in rebel groups and unrecognized states as
opposed to traditional state actors. Also, Kurdish militaries are especially relevant to study given
the attention of the international community and western media on their use of women.
Therefore, this research adds to two ongoing scholarly debates; the first being women’s
militarization in non-state groups, and the second being gender roles in Iraqi Kurdistan and
Northern Syria. To fully understand the present day relationship between female militarization
and women’s rights among the Kurds, it is crucial to discuss the history of Kurdish nationalism,
Kurdish female leaders, and women within the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK).
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The Kurds
The debate over the prospect of Kurdish statehood, commonly referred to as the “Kurdish
Question” has been present since the early 20th century. Following World War I, the 1920 Treaty
of Sèvres was drafted. The treaty included plans for a Kurdish state, but it was not ratified.
Instead, the Treaty of Lausanne was ratified in 1923, which blocked the creation of a Kurdistan.
This left the Kurds without a state, and are now spread across Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. As a
result, the Kurdish language, customs and traditions were repressed. In Turkey, Kurds were
referred to as “mountain Turks” and the names of Kurdish villages were changed to Turkish
(Gunter, 1988).
Studying Kurdish women’s military service in relation to women’s rights and gender
roles is incredibly salient. Although the Kurds as a group have been the subject of a growing
collection of literature since the early 2000s, much remains to be learned about Kurdish women,
particularly militant ones. Insights gained from studying women in the Peshmerga and the YPJ
extend beyond just Kurdish issues. Rather, this research can easily be applied to feminist studies
along with scholarship regarding nationalism and militarization.

Kurdish Women and the PKK
When examining Kurdish women and their current roles in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan,
the formation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is crucial to understand. The PKK was
founded by Abdullah Öcalan in Turkey in 1978. The PKK’s mission was to “make a communist
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revolution by guerilla warfare, and establish a separate Kurdish state” (Criss, 1995, p 18).
Women were active in the PKK from its very beginning. Kesire Yildirim, Öcalan’s ex-wife, was
one of the first women to support the PKK. Their failed marriage heavily influenced Öcalan’s
ban on marriage and sexual relationships for PKK militants (Marcus, 2007). A few years after its
establishment, the PKK targeted Mehmet Celal Bucak, a parliamentarian with right wing ties, for
political assassination. The attempt failed, but it nonetheless served its goal in declaring the
establishment of the PKK (Marcus, 2007).
In 1984, the PKK declared war against the Turkish state. Sakine Cansiz, another woman
in the PKK, was active during this time. She was eventually imprisoned for eleven years, but led
a Kurdish protest movement in prison. After her release in the early 1990s, Cansiz began
organizing the women’s movement within the PKK in Iraq (Letsch, 2013). This is when women
started joining the PKK in significant numbers (Tezcür, 2019). At first, the PKK was not
logistically able to accept so many women, but they needed more combatants for warfare
(Tezcür, 2019). Not long after joining in mass numbers, women started to take leadership
positions. In 1996, Zeynap Kinaci, a female PKK member, carried out the group’s first suicide
attack. She blew herself up in a Turkish military parade, injuring 30 people and killing ten
soldiers (Bayar, 2019).
Three years after the PKK’s first suicide bombing, Öcalan was captured and imprisoned
by Turkish special forces in Kenya. Despite his imprisonment, Öcalan is still an influential figure
in the PKK, as he continues to release public statements. Ideologically, Öcalan has moved away
from advocating for a Kurdish state. Instead, he has proposed “a new ‘truly’ democratic Turkish
republic, and a project of democratic confederalism” (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2011, p 151).
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Regarding Öcalan’s changing ideology, the writings of Murray Bookchin were incredibly
influential. In the 1980s, Bookchin, a former Stalinist, started developing ideas for “an
ecological, democratic society” (Biehl, 2012). He was anti-statist and advocated for small-scale
democratic assemblies to make decisions for a community. Öcalan began seeing nation-states as
oppressors, therefore adopting Bookchin’s approach of democratic confederalism rather than
calling for the creation of a Kurdish state (Cemgil & Hoffmann, 2016). Öcalan (2013, p. 26)
went so far as to claim that “housewifization is the oldest form of slavery.” What is commonly
referred to as the “Rojava Experiment” is a continuation of what Abdullah Öcalan began within
the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey. The PKK has been connected to Syrian Kurds
since the late 1980’s (Marcus, 2007).
Öcalan’s public statements and his writings both reflect a commitment to women’s
liberation. He even declared the PKK as a “women’s party” in 1998 (Damon, 2008). Öcalan
argues that along with its nationalist goals, the PKK “struggled against internal feudalism in
order to change the status of women and end the enslavement of society in general.” (Öcalan,
2013 p. 40)

Kurdish Women in Power
Outside of the PKK, there is a deep history of Kurdish women as leaders. As early as the
1600s, there were female tribe chieftains. In the 1850s, Kara Fatima Khanum acted as the
chieftan of her tribe following her husband’s imprisonment. She became famous in Europe for
commanding a Kurdish contingent during the Crimean War. Similarly, Adela Khanun was the
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wife of a chieftain and governor within the Ottoman government during the 20th century. She had
gardens and bazaars built, transforming her village of Halabja into a major trade center. Possibly
one of the most famous cases of a Kurdish woman gaining political influence can be seen in
Layla Zana. Like many powerful women before her, she was the wife of a Kurdish political
leader. When her husband was imprisoned, she turned to political activism. She eventually was
elected into Turkish parliament. In 1994, she was sentenced to prison for contacts with the PKK.
Through her political activism, Zana has solidified herself as an international symbol for Kurdish
nationalism (van Bruinessen, 2001).
With all of these examples in mind, it is important to note that these were all women in
aristocratic circles. There are comparatively far fewer examples of Kurdish women in power who
weren’t born into or married into influential families. It is undeniable, however, that these
women yielded tremendous power and influence, particularly Leyla Zana. It would therefore be a
mistake to give Öcalan all of the credit for spearheading women’s liberation. In fact, van
Bruinessen (2001, p 15) makes the argument that Leyla Zana rather than Abdullah Öcalan is
“the closest to Nelson Mandela that the Kurds have.”

Outcome of Interest
The creation of pro-woman policy, as well as women’s rights in both Kurdistan and
Northern Syria are the outcomes of interest for this study. Pro-woman policy will be defined as
statutes and laws that are concerned with women’s political and social equality. For this study,
women’s rights will refer to the practice of female genital mutilation child marriages, and
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women’s political participation. Female genital mutilation, child marriage and women’s political
participation are all appropriate measures for women’s rights. Legislation that has been passed
by the Kurdistan Regional Government as well as the New Charter of Rojava are against these
acts, making them logical choices to use to study whether rights have been improved or not.
Beyond whether or not laws are passed, the implementation of theses policies will also be
studied. To determine this, data on programs that work to educate and enforce policies are part of
this research. To examine women’s rights, data on female genital mutilation and child marriages
will be obtained by reading human rights reports from nongovernmental organizations.
Additionally, women’s involvement in the development of policies will also be examined.

Possible Drivers of Outcome
In this study, the possible drivers of outcomes will be lack of women’s empowerment,

women’s inability access to positions of influence, as well as the inability of women to use
these positions to implement change. Women’s military participation will be measured by

examining how many women are in military combat roles. This study will exclude women that
are involved in noncombat related support roles. Each intervening linkage between women’s
armed military participation and the outcome of women’s policy change will also be treated as
an independent variable.
Many female representatives of Kurdish Parliament rely on nominations by male party
leaders, leading them to reflect the party’s wishes rather than initiating change (Kaya, 2017).
Reading news reports and legal documents on what legislation has passed through parliament
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will provide information on which parliamentarians supported or opposed different acts. If
female parliamentarians do not vote in favor of legislation that is in favor of increasing women’s
rights, then it can be stated that they do not use their position to gain policy outcomes.

Alternative Explanations for Outcome of Interest
There are lingering questions about the motivations for policies being passed in Rojava
and Iraqi Kurdistan regarding women. One possibility for why Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan focus
on women’s rights is an effort for approval from foreign countries. Because Rojava is only de
facto independent and Iraqi Kurdistan is semi-autonomous, the backing of the international
community does carry some weight. Important to note is the United States’ role in supporting the
YPG/YPJ units. The United States began supplying arms to the Syrian Kurds in May of 2017
(Arafat, 2017). U.S. Support enabled the YPG to rise as a prominent military force (Barnard and
Hubbard, 2018). Because of Turkey’s designation of the YPG as a terrorist group, there were
questions of whether President Trump would continue to back the Kurds or pull out due to its
NATO ties with Turkey. In December of 2018, it was announced that the United States would be
withdrawing from Syria. While this effort may preserve U.S.-Turkey relations, the Kurds, along
with other potential partners of the United States, will likely feel skeptical about the Trump
administration (Macaron, 2018).
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Political Statements vs. Actions
The politicians of Iraqi Kurdistan have made statements and declarations regarding
women’s rights. Prime Minister Barzani criticized religious leaders for practicing FGM, calling
the measures “anti-women and anti-government. (Joly and Bakawan, 2016). Additionally, he has
publicly supported stronger policies for gender related violence in November of 2013 (Joly and
Bakawan, 2016). While the Prime Minister has made public statements, it is crucial to analyze
what measures are being taken. The Kurdistan Regional Government conducts educational
activities regarding FGM, including certifying midwives, conducting police trainings, and
creating presentations for schools and the general public (Schwartz, 2015). Despite these
measures, the question remains whether female activists or international actors motivated these
decisions.
A separate alternative explanation for the passing of pro-women legislation is a
dedication to Kurdish nationalist Abdullah Öcalan rather than the women within the societies. At
the beginning of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Öcalan stated that it was the Kurdish
movement’s responsibility to liberate women (Marcus, 2007). The influence of Öcalan therefore
ignited commitments to gender equality among the Kurds, specifically the PKK and the PYD.
This research aims to examine whether or not these commitments were made in an effort to
simply comply with Öcalan rather than to protect women themselves.
When looking at the Kurdish situation, it is undeniable that Abdullah Öcalan has had a
strong impact on Kurdish nationalism and the political pursuits of the Kurds. However, placing
him as the sole instigator of the women’s rights movement is an exaggeration. Additionally,
foreign support is not likely to adequately explain the roles of Kurdish women. After the
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Peshmerga was formed in 1943, women began joining in the 1960s. This was long before the
Iraqi Kurdistan referendum, or the de facto liberation of Rojava. Even though Rojava is newly de
facto, the political structures that are in place have been in place since the early 1990s.
Therefore, Kurdish women’s military involvement precedes United States’ interest in the Kurds.

Measuring Women’s Rights
Women’s rights are examined using several measures. To distinguish between what is
women’s empowerment and what is not women’s empowerment, the status of women before and
after women’s militarization is examined. Looking at women’s rights before they were heavily
involved in the Peshmerga and the YPJ provides a baseline for comparison on how women’s
rights have or have not evolved. Empowerment will be measured by looking at familial and
political structures that encourage women’s autonomy.
The theoretical framework and hypotheses discuss “positions of influence.” For the
purpose of this research, these positions are women that are in public roles that involve broad
levels of decision-making. This includes women that are in the job sector, are activists, or are
politicians. Data on women in positions of influence who were not in the Peshmerga or YPJ are
also included. This serves as a comparison for female ex-combatants’ societal engagement.
Women attaining positions of influence is measured through Internet research of news sites.
Societal opportunities for civic engagement will focus on women that are in
nongovernmental roles and are active in the workforce. Looking at women in the job sector
offers insight into civic engagement, because women who work outside of the home are more
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likely to mobilize politically (Ross, 2008). Women’s societal opportunities will look at what job
opportunities and positions are newly available to women. This measure will exclude positions
that were traditionally held by women before there were large numbers of women in the
Peshmerga and the YPJ.
All of these forms of participation are measured through systematic Internet research.
Data from Kurdish news sources including ANF English, Rudaw and Kurdistan 24 provide
information on women in who are attaining positions of influence. Additionally, the Kurdistan
Regional Government website has information on government structures and women who are
members of the Kurdistan Parliament.

Future Interviews with Peshmerga Women
Moving forward, future interviews with female ex-Peshmerga soldiers will be conducted.
These surveys serve as a method to measure the experiences of women before, during and after
their service. These primary accounts are crucial to understanding the full implications of
women’s militarization on women’s public participation and legislation.The survey is 40
questions long and is divided into three subsections. The first section asks questions background
and familial attitudes. The purpose of these questions is to measure attitudes regarding gender
equality and women’s empowerment before going into the Peshmerga. This sets a point for
comparison regarding whether female ex-combatants’ opinions on gender equality changed
during service.
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The second section includes questions regarding time in the Peshmerga. These questions
focus on instances of gender discrimination and training on Öcalan’s political ideologies. This
section measures the training and exposure that ex-combatants, rather than female noncombatants would receive. This information distinguishing them from other women is important
to acknowledge, especially considering that the theoretical framework of this research focuses on
the distinct experiences of female ex-combatants. The final question in this section asks to
compare the number of women in commanding positions to the number of men. This measures
the feasibility of women gaining positions of influence within the military.
The third section of the interview questions looks at attitudes and feelings of
empowerment after Peshmerga service. Specifically, these questions focus on women’s beliefs
that they are equipped for politics or the public sector. This section includes questions about
employment and political activism of Peshmerga women. These questions correspond with the
third and fourth linkages of the theoretical framework, which refer to societal opportunities for
engagement and female ex-combatants tangibly attaining them. Additionally, questions about
knowing Peshmerga women that try to be politically active or try to gain positions in activism
will be used to measure whether Peshmerga are trying to gain positions of influence.
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WOMEN’S ROLES AND OPPORTUNITIES
To understand the extent to which women’s rights are being pursued, examining
women’s roles and opportunities provides insight into women’s societal integration. There are a
few sectors worthy of studying to determine whether women’s roles and rights are transforming.
Whether or not women are taking on new employment or societal roles is indicative of changing
attitudes towards women’s roles. In the 1990s, the PKK made efforts to include women by
holding women’s assemblies (Knapp, Flack, & Ayboga, 2016). The following section looks at
women’s roles within Kurdish systems of governance along with the private sector.

Kurdish Women in Northern Syria before 2011
After the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, there was an influx of Kurds into Syria. The
Kurds were given some freedom when it came to publishing and broadcasting in Syria during the
French mandate. In the mid 1950s, the newly independent Syrian government seized and
destroyed Kurdish publications (Hassanpour, Kangas and Chyet, 1996). Compared to the Kurds
in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, Kurds in Syria had little role in early Kurdish Independence
movements. This changed when the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria was founded in 1957.
Nine years later, the party would split into the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria and The
Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in Syria. Throughout the seventies and eighties, each of
the groups was split off into multiple parties. When Hafez al-Assad first took power in 1971, the
Kurds began to experience newfound freedom. This eventually led to the creation of the Kurdish
National Council in 2011. (al-Kati, 2019)
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Prior to the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, a few resources for women in Syria existed.
Women were granted the right to vote in 1949 and could stand in elections in 1953 (Kelly &
Breslin, 2010). The General Women’s Union (GWU) was formed in 1967 for the purpose of
developing women’s welfare and political participation (Bellafronto, 2004). In 2003, Syria
passed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) with reservations for articles on issues including women passing her nationality onto
her children, freedom of movement, equal rights in marriage, and the legal effect of child
marriages (Kelly & Breslin, 2010).
The Kurdish population in Syria was consistently discriminated against. In the 1960s
roughly 120,000 Syrian Kurds were stripped of their citizenship. Kurdish political parties were
also banned, and Kurdish language publications were limited. Although the Syrian government
suppressed its Kurdish population, they were supportive of Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria.
Iraqi Kurds were willing to support Syria in its regional conflict with Iraq. This allowed for PKK
influence to take hold in Syria in the 1980s (Marcus, 2007). From this information, it can be
gathered that Kurdish women in Syria were not guaranteed the same limited rights as Arab
women.

Women in Rojava
With the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, Bashar al Assad withdrew the Syrian Army
and government administration from parts of Northern Syria in July of 2012. This allowed for
the Democratic Union Party (PYD) to step in and take control (Federici, 2015). A year later, the
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PYD announced a Kurdish Constitution. The constitution established three cantons within a
Kurdish Autonomous region (Radpey, 2015). The canton structure is known as the People’s
Council of West Kurdistan (MGRK). The MGRK is divided into four levels; communes,
neighborhoods, districts, and the MGRK itself. The region is divided into three cantons: Afrîn,
Kobanî, and Cizîrê. The canton system was largely based off of Öcalan’s teachings of
democratic confederalism. Additionally, the canton system utilizes Öcalan’s concepts of gender
equality, as each canton has a male and female co-chair.
Other than the canton system, there are several organizations within Rojava that
specialize in women’s rights and education. Kongreya Star, originally Yekitiya Star, was
founded in 2005. It is an organization largely dedicated to the political education of women.
Kongreya Star gives women a ten-day training program on the councils and communes. Kurdish
women are not the only ethnic group active in women’s mobilization. The Syrian Women’s
Association is an organization that includes women who are Kurds, Arabs, Yezidis, and Syrians.
The association is not part of the larger MGRK council system, but it is focused on creating laws
and forums for women’s liberation movements (Knapp, et al 2016).
The women in Rojava that are spearheading women’s revolution have a strong focus on
youth. The Youth Confederation specifically focuses on educating women. Doz Kobaî, a
member of the Youth Confederation, states that the organization educates women on “the
position of women in society before patriarchy and what man has done to her in all the eras
since” (Knapp et al., 2016). Other youth efforts include hosting a Conference on Young
Revolutionary Women. Another organization focused on women’s rights is the Foundation of
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Free Women in Rojava. This foundation has developed women’s health centers and preschools
(Knapp et al., 2016).

Non-Governmental Employment in Rojava
Outside of the co-leadership positions, women in Rojava take on roles in different
sectors. The Women’s Economy directorate is one office that supports women’s employment.
Their office supports 4,500 women in agricultural projects through training and assistance
(Lynch, 2019). Women in Rojava are also able to obtain jobs. This includes serving as traffic
cops and defense ministers (Lemmon, 2018). Last year, an all-women market was opened in
Derik City in Rojava (Shekhani, 2018). The market director states that the market was developed
for women who faced “social restrictions”, referring to women who did not hold certificates or
who were housewives (Shekhani 2018). The Star Union of Women financially supports the
market. Other than business, women are heavily involved in agriculture and education. In Afrîn,
56 percent of workers in agriculture are women, and 70 percent of the members of teachers
unions are women (Knapp, et al., 2016).
Women’s representation in the media is another cornerstone of society in Rojava. The
Kurdish Women’s Press Association was founded in 2013. The association was formed in order
to unionize female journalists. The founding conference for the association stated that a women’s
radio station in Rojava would be established and a women’s media academy would be opened
(Knapp et. al, 2016).
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Opportunities and Structures for YPJ Women
There is a perceived connection between including women in the YPJ and the broader
rights that are being granted to them in Syria. One YPJ commander claims that because of YPJ
participation, women “play their role in media, health, economy, art and culture, language
training, in every field (Darden, 2015 p. 51). The revolution in Rojava has often been described
as not only a cultural revolution, but also a women’s revolution. One YPJ fighter states that
“before the revolution, most Kurdish women were staying in their homes. Since I began fighting
for my country, these attitudes have been changing” (Johnson, 2013). Because of the distinct
inclusion of women in leadership in Rojava, it is unlikely that former YPJ women will return to
their traditional roles. Now that Rojava has spaces for women in politics, education and health,
women in the YPJ will now have more options for activism than they did prior to military
service.
New YPJ recruits are given a military education that includes political thought,
democratic autonomy and self-defense (Serhat & Servan 2015). The women in the YPJ are
exposed to the concept of jineolojî, or “women’s science” in their training camps (Knapp et al.,
2014). Jineolojî has also spread to women’s academies built by Yekîtiya Star. This implies that
ideas of women’s liberation and determination are not confined to the YPJ. Instead, these are
concepts that permeate all aspects of life in Rojava.
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Kurdish Women in Iraq before ISIS
Although the Peshmerga is older than the YPJ, the number of women involved has never
been as high. Some of the legendary Peshmerga women from the 20th century include Margaret
George and Hero Ibrahim Ahmad (Lortz, 2012; Goudsouzain, 2016). Women like George and
Ahmad were in the minority at the time, and thus had limited influence on social change and
political processes. It was not until 1995 that Colonel Nahida Rashid created the first women’s
Peshmerga unit (Nilsson, 2018). Even with the creation of the women’s unit, women were not
fully integrated and utilized until the emergence of the Islamic state in 2014 (Marouf, 2018). The
few women that were active in the Peshmerga during the 1990s had limited success in gaining
positions of influence. The exceptions to this were women who were married to men in power.
Kafiya Suleiman, for example, is the wife of former leading commander Omer Fetah. She
became the secretary general of the PUK Women’s Union in the early 1990s (Fischer-Tahir,
2014). Therefore, the roles of Kurdish women in Iraq from the 1990s up until the early 2000s
serve as a baseline for examining whether women’s inclusion in the Peshmerga has impacted
women’s roles and rights.
In the first Kurdistan parliament in 1992, six out of 105 members were women
(McDonald, 2001). However, in its early history, the KRG still had more progressive stance than
did Iraq. For instance, Iraq’s 1990 Penal Code, which legalized honor killings, was renounced in
the KRG in 2000 (Brown & Romano, 2006). Additionally, although none of them were
Peshmerga militants at the time, Kurdish women still engaged in peace activism during the 1994
war between the PUK and KDP (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2011). Kurdish women were also involved in
activism with the formation of the Independent Women’s Organization (IWO) in 1993. Its main
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objectives were raising awareness of honor killings and establishing shelters for abused women
(Mojab & Gorman, 2007). In 1992, 15,000 women signed a petition asking parliament to abolish
polygamy and grant equal rights to inheritance and divorce, but the parliament rejected the
proposals (Mojab, 2001). These examples show that even before women were involved in the
Peshmerga, there were still some mechanisms, albeit limited ones, available for political
representation and activism.

Women in Iraqi Kurdistan Present Day
Since its first parliamentary elections in 1992, women have been granted an increasing
amount of access to politics and activism. Iraqi Kurdistan, similar to Rojava, has also created
government structures for women. The political structure of Iraq is somewhat different from
Rojava, as it is a semi-autonomous region in Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan therefore has its own
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Kurdistan Parliament. Although not a fully
autonomous state, Kurdistan does have representatives in several countries, including the United
States, Iran, and Russia. Because of Kurdistan’s government structure and government, they
have been able to build structures and institutions for women. In 2007, the Kurdistan Regional
Government set up the General Directorate for Tracing Violence against Women (GDTVW).
The goals of the GDTVW are collecting data, following up on legal cases, and raising awareness
of violence against women (Joly & Bakawan, 2016).
Within the KRG, there is a Women’s Rights Monitoring Board and a High Council of
Women’s Affairs. The Ministry of the Interior has a general directorate to combat violence
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against women, as well as their regional directorates in Erbil, Slemani and Duhok. In addition to
these institutions, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible for running women’s
shelters, while the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs aims to mobilize religious
efforts against gender based violence. The Independent Human Rights Commission is a
commission funded by the KRG. It has produced human rights reports and has worked with
Doctors Without Borders to provide support for women in IDP camps (IHRCKR, 2017).
Women have served as ministers in the KRG cabinet, although not to the same extent as
men. In the sixth and seventh cabinets, only one of the nineteen ministers was a woman (Hardi,
2013). In the current eighth cabinet, there are three female ministers out of a total of twenty-four
(Kurdistan Regional Government). A woman, Dr. Rewas Faiq Hussein, is currently serving as
the Speaker of Parliament. Before Dr. Hussein became the speaker, another woman, Val Fareed,
served as the interim speaker in February 2019. This made her the first female speaker of the
Kurdistan Parliament (Aldroubi, 2019). Muna Kahveci, a female representative from the
Turkmen Reform Party, was elected as the second female deputy speaker (van Wilgenburg,
2019). In the current Kurdistan parliament, there are 36 female parliamentarians out of a total
111 (The Baghdad Post, 2018). One of these 36 women, Hazhan Kwestani, is a former
Peshmerga soldier (Kurdistan Parliament).
Despite the political support structures for women, Kurdish women that are not part of
political institutions face challenges. Kurdish women activists that are not sponsored by the main
political parties of the KRG face their own challenges (al-Ali & Pratt, 2011). Both the KDP and
the PUK have their own offshoots that are concerned with women’s rights. The Kurdistan
Women’s Union (KWU) is the KDP’s women’s organization. The KWU was founded in 1952
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and offers numerous resources for women, including job training, health care centers and
education services (The Kurdish Project). The KRG recognizes that despite the inclusion of
women in different sectors, “social and cultural considerations continue to restrict the equal
access of women to resources and leadership positions in society.” (Kurdistan Region of Iraq
2020, p. 11)

Non-Governmental Employment in Iraqi Kurdistan
Outside of politics, Kurdish women are less active in the private sector. A 2014 World
Bank Survey found that only 11 percent of women were active in the labor force (Dexter, 2016).
In comparison, eighty percent of women in the workforce in Iraqi Kurdistan work in government
(Kurdistan Region of Iraq 2020). More than half of non-working women want to work. A World
Bank study found that most individuals in Iraqi Kurdistan had positive attitudes toward women
working. In fact, over 70% of men and women surveyed found it acceptable for women to work
in the private sector. The same study found that the constraints that women faced were lack of
access to child care and a lack of job security after maternity leave (World Bank, 2019).
The Ministry of Planning in the KRG released a document titled Kurdistan Region of
Iraq 2020: A Vision for the Future which includes concerns for women. One of the policy
priorities outlined is “Helping women enter the labor market and succeed”. Under this heading,
the policy details measures that must be taken to include women. The document emphasizes that
government statements and actions will “show that women deserve equal opportunities in the
labor market” (p. 17). Including this policy objective demonstrates that the KRG is both aware of
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and committed to including women in the private sector. By outlining and implementing policy
objectives, the KRG aims to diversify and include women more broadly in the workforce.
Another structure that exists for women in Iraqi Kurdistan are non-governmental
organizations. Women began organizing and building NGOs in the late 1990s. Although they
were dedicated to their causes, the women that started these efforts were underpaid and
inexperienced. Within the past ten years however, there have been more substantial efforts to
train and educate NGO leaders (Hardi, 2013).

Opportunities and Structures for Peshmerga Women
Female Peshmerga soldiers have expressed concerns about whether or not they will
maintain their positions after the fight against ISIS concludes (Marouf, 2018). Prior to the
emergence of ISIS, the women that were active in the Peshmerga typically served in support
roles. This included running women’s shelters and maintaining border security. With the
onslaught of the Islamic State, women began to take on more combat roles. Because of the shifts
in women’s roles, female Peshmerga soldiers are now questioning what their roles will be like in
the forces post ISIS.
Some of the women of the Peshmerga are motivated to pursue political and social
activism. These advocacy positions include acting as a lawyer to stop domestic violence and
volunteer work (Nilsson, 2018). Because of these newfound roles, many Peshmerga women
believe that women’s militarization has promoted changes for gender equality (Nilsson, 2018).
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Women that are currently in the Peshmerga have a few examples to look at when
determining what post Peshmerga life will hold. Amineh Kakabaveh is an Iranian Kurdish exPeshmerga fighter who sought asylum in Sweden in the 1990s. Kakabaveh then became a
Swedish Member of Parliament in 2008 and maintains her position (Branchereau 2018). Hero
Ibrahim Ahmad was also a Peshmerga fighter, but her service was in the 1980s against the
Baathist regime. As the former first lady of Iraq, Ahmad is still influential in the PUK. However,
she has been subject to personal attacks from patriarchal sects of Kurdish society over the past
three decades (Goudsouzian 2016). Pakhshan Zangana is another former Peshmerga soldier who
currently serves as the head of the High Council for Women’s Affairs (Rahman, 2019).
Looking at Kakabaveh and Ahmad, it seems as if Peshmerga women are positioned to
enter politics after service. With this being said, Kakabaveh and Ahmad were Peshmerga soldiers
long before the rise of ISIS and the dramatic increase of the recruitment of women. Additionally,
there are women within Iraqi Kurdistan who became politically active without direct Peshmerga
involvement. However, many of these women have fathers or husbands who are active in
politics. Comparatively, there is a greater percentage of women that are in KRG legislature than
there are women in the Peshmerga. This shows that armed group participation is not the only
way for women to pursue political involvement (Darden et al. 2019, p. 52).
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WOMEN AND ELECTIONS
Although Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan differ in government structure, they each present
opportunities for women to participate in government processes. The canton structure of Rojava
is built up of local municipalities, in which every position at every government level in Rojava
has a female equivalent in authority. Rojava is commonly referred to as a “woman’s revolution,”
as seen by the political activism of women like Hevi Ibrahim, the prime minister of the Afrin
Canton (Civiroglu, 2014). As previously mentioned, Iraqi Kurdistan has a parliamentary system
that women can serve in. The flowing section will examine the structures that are present for
women and whether they carry out their intended purposes.

Effectiveness of Women and Elections
Within governments that have gender quotas, there are questions of the effectiveness of
mandatory involvement of women. The central question for women’s involvement is whether
women’s participation translates to women’s representation. In Iraqi Kurdistan, there is a
mandatory thirty percent quota for women in parliament. Regarding parliamentary elections in
Iraqi Kurdish parliament, there were 241 female candidates competing for representation in the
2018 election. Thirty-four women had served in the previous term. The KDP had 12 female
members of parliament, followed by eight in the Gorran party, six in the PUK, three in the KIU
and two in Komal. The Turkmen parties each had one female member of parliament, while the
Christian parties had two (Ahmad, 2018). In July of 2018, Kurdish parliament amended a law
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that requires one of the three leading members of parliament—the speaker and the two deputies,
to be a woman (Ali, 2019).
Women who run for office in Iraqi Kurdistan are subject to their own set of challenges. In
the Iraqi parliament, Kurdish female candidates have been the targets of fake sex tapes and
revealing photos in efforts to undermine their aspirations (Edwards, 2018). Although the quota
requires that there are women in parliament, critics claim that the result is hardly
representational. Hezha Khan, a women’s activist in Iraqi Kurdistan, doubts that the seats in
parliament are spread evenly among the social classes. Instead, she believes that most of the
seats go to women who are related to men that are in power (Edwards, 2018). This implies that
familial ties, rather than Peshmerga service, is a greater determinant for a woman’s likelihood to
be in politics. Dr. Choman Hardi, the founder of the Center for Gender and Development Studies
at the American University of Iraq in Sulaimani, is critical of the thirty percent quota in the
Kurdistan parliament. Regarding women in parliament, Hardi states “some people believe that
they were chosen intentionally to be ineffective so that they don’t threaten the system” (van
Wilgenburg, 2019). Because of these negative experiences, political parties may have trouble
encouraging women to run for office.

Laws for Women’s Equality
Along with passing gender quotas, both the MGRK in Nothern Syria and the KRG have
passed legislation that is inclusive of women and women’s rights. Rojava’s Constitution makes
numerous references to the status of women. Iraqi Kurdistan has passed two major legislative
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acts that outlaw female genital mutilation and has banned child marriage. The passing of these
laws demonstrates societal attitudes toward women’s rights, and whether or not governments are
supportive in outlawing regressive practices. In addition to the creation of laws, it is important to
note what language and definitions are included. Both Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan have laws that
received general support and clearly outline definitions for terminology such as gender equality
and domestic violence.

Legal Frameworks in Rojava
In Rojava, the concept of gender equality can be seen throughout its legal system. The
Constitution of the Rojava Cantons was passed in 2014. Women and gender are discussed in
several different articles. Article 23 a states that “everyone has the right to express their ethnic,
cultural, linguistic and gender rights.” Article 28 explicitly states that the “Charter guarantees the
effective realization of equality of women and mandates public institutions to work towards the
elimination of gender discrimination.” It is in Article 47 that the constitution lays out that the
Legislative Assembly must be composed of at least forty percent of either sex. In addition to this,
men with histories of domestic violence or polygamy are excluded from organizations (Dirik,
2014).
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Legal Frameworks in Iraqi Kurdistan
Similar to the Rojava canton system, the Kurdistan Parliament has also passed legislation
regarding women’s rights. The Kurdistan Parliament passed Act No. 15 on November 3rd, 2008.
This legislation was an amendment to the Personal Status Law that was initially passed in 1959.
The first article defines marriage as a “voluntary contract” and states that husbands must have
the permission of his first wife in order to marry a second wife. The law outlaws forced
marriage, and states that any relative who breaks this can be sentenced to two to five years in
prison. The Law against Domestic Violence was adopted in 2011. The bill received support from
68 of the 111 parliamentarians, securing a majority (Khalife, 2010). The law provides a
definition for domestic violence that extends to physical and psychological harm, as well as
deprivation of liberties. Thirteen different examples of domestic violence are outlined, including
female genital mutilation, forced marriage, and marriage of minors.
The Law against Domestic Violence was subject to media attention when Mullah Ismael
Sosaae, a religious leader, demanding that Prime Minister Barzani refuse to sign the bill into law.
Barzani complied with not signing the bill, but he did allow for it to go into effect when it was
published in the Government’s Official Gazette in August of 2011 (Iraqi Kurdistan: Law banning
FGM not being enforced, 2012). One year later, the Supreme Council for Women Affairs in the
KRG passed the National Strategy to Confront Violence against Women in Kurdistan. This is a
five-year plan that outlined goals of passing more legislation for women and increasing women’s
political participation (National Strategy to Combat Violence Against Women, 2012).
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Applying Women’s Rights Legislation
As previously mentioned in the theory, only looking at legal frameworks does not
provide enough insight into women’s rights. Rather, this must be combined with studying the
application of laws. One of the main challenges of applying the laws in Iraqi Kurdistan is an
overall lack of awareness of the people. The Warvin Organization surveyed 1000 women in Iraqi
Kurdistan in 2013. When asked about awareness of the Combatting Violence against women act,
43 percent of women were not aware of the law at all. Twenty eight percent of women knew that
there was such a law, while 18 percent were aware of some of the articles and only 11 percent
were fairly aware of the law. The same report stated that 42 percent of women had “never seen
any woman” benefit from the law, 25 percent of women had “rarely seen” women benefit, 24
percent had “seen some women benefit,” and only nine percent saw “many women benefit” (AlMassala Organization for Human Development, 2013).
Similarly, a UN survey was conducted in Erbil on opinions on female genital mutilation.
Sixty-eight percent of people surveyed stated that they were against the practice of FGM. Of
these people surveyed, 60 percent of them said that they were unaware that FGM had even been
outlawed (Ford, 2014). The 2011 “Law of Combatting Violence Within the Family,” stated that a
special court would be established for familial violence. However, this court has yet to be
established, allowing practices like female genital mutilation to be continued without punishment
(Hardi, 2013). One reason why the KRG has struggled to implement the law is the number of
mothers who perform FGM on their daughters. These women are less likely to file complaints
against their parents (Agence-France Presse, 2019).
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Along with all of this, some religious leaders are still in favor or FGM. A 2018 study
interviewing 29 religious leaders in the Erbil governate found that most of the interviewees did
not support outlawing FGM. The participants were not directly asked if they were aware of the
existing law, but only one participant referenced the existence of the law (Ahmed, Kareem,
Shabila & Mzori, 2018). In 2019, the KRG announced a new plan to eradicate FGM by 2028.
The plan includes the cooperation of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, and Ministry
of Religious Affairs (Sulaivany, 2019).

Violence against Women, Child Marriages and Honor Killings
Despite the laws that are in place to protect women in Kurdistan and Rojava, they are still
subject to illegal practices. Breaking down and looking at instances of violence, child marriages,
female genital mutilation, and honor killings provide insights into women’s status and whether
laws are being enforced. These three measures were chosen because they have roots in Kurdish
culture.
A 2013 study in Erbil found that over half of women surveyed were subject to emotion,
physical or sexual violence from their husbands (Al-Atrushi, Tawil, Shabila and Hadithi, 2013).
In 2015, there were 7,436 registered complaints of violence against women in Iraqi Kurdistan,
compared to 6,673 complaints in the previous year (Parvaz, 2016). A CEDAW Shadow Report
was conducted in 2014. The report found that child marriages had increased from 2003 through
2014 in Iraqi Kurdistan. The report speculates that economic development and tradition were two
driving factors for the increase of child marriages. In the year 2017, there were fourteen reported

49

cases of honor killings in Iraqi Kurdistan (Dolemari, 2018). Although women are protected from
honor killings by law, cultural undertones of the practice enable its prevalence.

Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi Kurdistan
Compared to other countries where FGM Is practiced, Iraq has relatively low rates
(Ahmed, Shabu, and Shabila 2019). Female genital mutilation is still practiced in Iraqi
Kurdistan, but studies indicate that the practice is actually decreasing. In 2018, a UNICEF survey
found that 37.5% of women had been mutilated, compared to 58.5% in 2014 (Agence FrancePresse, 2019). A 2011 study using 1,508 females aged 6 months to 20 years of age was
conducted among the provinces of Erbil, Sulaimaniyah and Duhok. The practice of FGM was
reported in about 37% or participants from Erbil, 29% in Sulaimaniyah, and 4% in Duhok
(Saleem, Othman, Fattah, Hazim and Adnan, 2013). Salem et al. (2013) also examined attitudes
about FGM from women who had already undergone the practice. Their findings state that 51%
of participants with no education favored FGM, but only 27% of those with basic education and
18% with a high school education favored it (Saleem, et al. 2013). Similarly, a 2013 study using
1987 women from ages 15-49 was conducted in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan. Yasin, Al-Tawil, Shabila
and Hadithi, (2013) found that the practice was significantly associated with women’s
employment status. The findings from these studies suggest that women’s level of education and
employment status affect the likelihood of women undergoing FGM.
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Supporters and Dissidents of Women’s Rights
To trace reasons why violations against women are still carried out, it is important to
determine which figures in power either support or speak out against violence. Similar to the
traditional nature of honor killings, FGM may be encouraged by clerics and scholars to preserve
customs. In 2015 an Iraqi Kurdish media network interviewed Sunni preacher Mullah Ali Kalak.
Kalak at the time encouraged Kurdish Muslims to continue the practice of FGM despite the laws
prohibiting it. After speaking with a representative from Gender, an NGO in Erbil, Kalak agreed
to stop practicing FGM and cease from encouraging others to defy the KRG (Schwartz, 2015).
While some men in public positions like Kalak may encourage FGM, it is usually women
that support and even carry out the practice. A 2014 UNICEF survey found that 75% of women
saw their mothers as being supportive of cutting (Agence France-Press, 2015). This can prevent
FGM from being reported, as women may feel hesitant to report parents for breaking the law.
Unlike Kalak, there are cases of men in power who support movements for women’s
rights. Even prior to FGM being outlawed in Iraqi Kurdistan, the High Committee for Issuing
Fatwas at the Kurdistan Islamic Scholars Union issued a fatwa stating that Islam does not require
FGM (Iraqi Kurdistan: Law Banning FGM Not Being Enforced, 2012). Outside of religion,
politicians have also voiced their support for women’s rights. Male politicians are overall less
likely to be against changing gender roles for women. Rather, men that are in lower positions
typically felt threatened by women’s new roles (al-Ali and Pratt, 2010).
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LIMITATIONS
With the methodology used for this study, there are several limitations. The Internet
research that was gathered is based off of secondhand accounts. Therefore, there are possibilities
for bias from journalists and reporters. Additionally, the government websites for the KRG and
Rojava will also support a very specific narrative that is inclusive of women. However, an
advantage of using news sources is that they will offer up to date information on political and
social developments. The legal documents and laws that are passed will be useful in determining
when, why and how legislation was passed, and will offer little to no bias.
The future interviews conducted with primary sources offers an in depth analysis of
women’s lives before, during, and after their Peshmerga service. With this being said, the
answers given in the interview are subject to the interviewees’ personal biases. The subjects of
the study may feel protective of the Peshmerga, and their service. This might lead to a skewed
perspective of the rights of women and whether or not they are achieving true equality through
military service.
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DISCUSSION
Women in Rojava and women in Iraqi Kurdistan have faced different histories and
therefore have different experiences regarding gender equality. In Rojava, it easier to make a
connection between an increase in women’s rights and the creation of the Women’s Protection
Units (YPJ). This is because many gender equality initiatives took place concurrently with the
establishment of the YPJ. In Iraqi Kurdistan however, the situation is somewhat different.
Although women are able to serve in the Peshmerga and hold political office, it is difficult to
establish a link between the two. There are a few standout cases of former Peshmerga women
entering politics, but for the most part, the roles of ex-Peshmerga remains to be seen. It can be
argued that through the laws passed by the KRG and the initiatives taken by Kurdish NGOs,
Iraqi Kurds support efforts toward ensuring women’s equality. With this being said, Iraqi
Kurdistan has not seen as dramatic of a surge in women’s activism and political participation as
has Rojava.
It is important to also note the vast differences between the Kurds in Iraq and the Kurds
in Syria. Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan emerged in very different socio-political conditions (Cemgil
& Hoffman, 2016). For instance, the Kurdistan Regional Government does not prescribe to the
same notions of democratic confederalism that Rojava does. The Kurdish region in Iraq is
governed on “socially conservative, tribal lines within a capitalist economic framework” (Gupta,
2017). Therefore, it is possible that Rojava simply had the right mechanisms and opportunities
that allowed gender equality to develop.
Along with differing political structures in both Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Syria, the
role of class greatly differs between in region. Historically, women in Iraqi Kurdistan have been
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able to gain influence through their husbands and families. This can be seen in present day Iraqi
Kurdistan, with both female ex-Peshmerga soldiers and non-combatants. In Rojava however,
there is a greater number of women who do not have family connections that are active in
leadership. Therefore, it can be seen that the “women’s revolution” in Northern Syria is an
intersectional one, as positions of influence are not reserved for only upper class women.
It is clear that both the Kurds in Iraq and the Kurds in Syria are heavily influenced by
Öcalan’s ideals of women’s autonomy. It is unlikely that the Peshmerga and the YPJ have only
used women to support a Kurdish nationalist agenda. This can be seen in the efforts that are
being put forth by the canton structure and the KRG. If the Kurds were simply using women for
a nationalist struggle, they would not be able to serve in the Kurdistan Parliament or have
positions of influence in Rojava.
Referring back to the hypotheses, H1 is correct in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan. Many
women formerly active in the Peshmerga that have been successful in pursuing political careers
have been married to influential figures. Women that do not have these connections have
struggled to become politically involved. In this case, military service does not seem to have a
strong impact on women’s political involvement, since there are non-Peshmerga women in the
KRG. The gender politics of Northern Syria, however, differ. Women in Northern Syria are
included in more levels of decision making than women in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Looking at H2, it can be argued that this is not necessarily the case for Iraqi Kurdistan.
As previously stated, not all women that that are active in the Kurdistan Regional Government
have a history of Peshmerga service. Therefore, in Iraqi Kurdistan, women’s militarization is not
the only mechanism for women to pursue social and political change. The same cannot be said
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for Kurdish women in Rojava. In Rojava, the reason why there is so much change is because
women are included in all levels of decision-making. The women that are active in the YPJ have
a strong link to the politics, governance and overall activism in Rojava.

Liberation for Kurdish Women: What Next?
Through the efforts of Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan, it can be seen that each government and the
organizations within them have gender equality agenda. With this in mind, there is still room for
improvement in both Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan. Some of the strongest criticism against the
Kurdistan Regional Government is that they are not doing enough to enforce laws regarding
gender equality. Women that are active in KRG politics are also subject to their own sets of
challenges. Critics assert that many women in parliament only gained these positions due to their
political affiliations rather than their actual abilities (van Wilgenburg, 2019).
Comparatively, there is less global criticism of the women in Northern Syria. Part of this
might be because it is simply more difficult to obtain exact numbers regarding female genital
mutilation and honor killings in the region. There are still women in Rojava that are not active in
organizations and that are economically dependent on their husbands (Knapp et al., 2016). The
demographic that faces the most challenges are married women. The revolution and new
positions that women are able to gain go against traditional gender roles that their husbands are
accustomed to.
Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Syria are both in stages of political change, so there remains
much more to be seen in the upcoming future. This is especially true for the drastic changes in
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Rojava. Idris Nassan, a politician in Rojava, questions whether or not returning male refugees
“will be able to change their mentality since they have not been part of the cultural revolution”
(Argentieri, 2016). It remains to be seen what societal attitudes toward women in positions of
influence will be like after the Syrian Civil War. In Iraqi Kurdistan, initiatives for women’s
equality have developed more gradually, and also independently from women’s involvement in
the Peshmerga. It can then be argued that legislation and reforms for women’s equality are more
stable in Iraqi Kurdistan than in Rojava.
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CONCLUSION
Studying women in Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Syria offers distinct insights into how
female militarization impacts gender roles in a society. The case of the Kurds varies greatly from
most revolutionary groups. Whereas many nationalist movements utilize women for their cause
and afterward abandon women’s rights, the Kurds have consistently supported their public
claims of gender equality. This is evident in governmental and organizational efforts in both
Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Syria.
While it can be said that the Kurds practice what they espouse, there are still further steps
to be taken to ensure women’s equality. In Iraqi Kurdistan, there is a low percentage of women
that are employed in nongovernmental positions. A similar problem exists in Rojava, but instead
of just a lack of employed women, the region suffers from a low amount of workers due to the
Syrian Civil War and the rise of the Islamic State (Assad, 2019). Other than issues of
employment, female genital mutilation, honor killings and violence against women are still
carried out in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Avenues for future research include more in depth analysis for women in the YPJ.
Depending on the direction of the Syrian Civil War, it would be worthwhile to study what
Kurdish women’s rights will look like in Northern Syria post-conflict. This research adds
insights to both the discussion of gender equality among the Kurds in Syria and Iraq, as well as
to theories on women’s militarization and women’s rights.
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